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INTRODUCTION
The Bonnet Carré and Morganza spillways, designed almost 100 years
ago to save Louisiana from Mississippi River floods, are as much a part of
life in south Louisiana as crawfish boils, speckled trout, and Saturday
nights in Death Valley. The spillways were also constructed with a
secondary purpose in mind—to prevent the Mississippi River from
changing course at the Old River Control Structure (“Old River”). 1
Unfortunately, recent increases in the duration and intensity of the
Mississippi River flooding, combined with outdated designs in
infrastructure, have outpaced the century-old spillways and threaten to
destroy Sportsman’s Paradise. 2
This Comment will primarily focus on the Bonnet Carré Spillway and
its impacts on the brackish ecosystems of south Louisiana. The Morganza
Spillway has only been opened twice in its history, whereas the Bonnet
Carré has been opened 15 times with the average time between openings
rapidly dropping. 3 The Bonnet Carré Spillway’s usage has more than
Copyright 2022, by CLAY PARKER.
∗ J.D.D/D.C.L., 2022, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. The author would like to extend his thanks to Professor Nicholas
Bryner and Professor Kathryn Simino, as well as the editorial boards of Journal
of Energy Law and Resources Volume IX and X, for their help in the writing
process. The author would also like to thank his friends and family for their
support and encouragement throughout.
1. Mississippi River & Tributaries, NEW ORLEANS DIST., U.S. ARMY CORPS
ENG’RS, https://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/Missions/Mississippi-River-Flood-Con
trol/Mississippi-River-Tributaries/ [https://perma.cc/P3BX-ZQ93] (last visited Oct.
22, 2021); see Jeff Masters, America’s Achilles’ Heel: The Mississippi River’s Old
River Flood Control Structure, WEATHER UNDERGROUND (May 10, 2019, 6:03
AM), https://www.wunderground.com/cat6/Americas-Achilles-Heel-MississippiRivers-Old-River-Control-Structure [https://perma.cc/8CVL-EUFH] (explaining
the Old River Control Structure regulates the Mississippi River where it meets the
Atchafalaya River).
2. See Anita Lee, Dolphins, Sea Turtles, Oysters Dying Along Gulf Coast;
Experts Point to Bonnet Carre Spillway, THE ADVOCATE (Apr. 22, 2019, 1:23
PM) [hereinafter Experts Point to Bonnet Carre Spillway], https://www.the
advocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_6c33033c-652b-11e9-9831-434df6daf3
f1.html; Anita Lee, The Power to Open Bonnet Carré Spillway Rests 200 Miles
from ‘Struggling’ Gulf Coast, SUN HERALD (Aug. 14, 2019, 6:43 PM) [hereinafter
200 Miles], https://www.sunherald.com/news/local/counties/harrison-county/art
icle231398673.html.
3. See Historic Operations of the Bonnet Carré Spillway, NEW ORLEANS
DIST., U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, https://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/Missions/
Mississippi-River-Flood-Control/Bonnet-Carre-Spillway-Overview/Historic-Op
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tripled in the last 20 years compared to the previous 69 years. 4 Most
significantly, in 2019 the Bonnet Carré opened twice in one year: once in
February and again in May. 5 This unprecedented double opening led to
saltwater creatures such as dolphins, sea turtles, and oysters dying en
masse due to sudden, prolonged drops in salinity from the influx of fresh
river water. 6
The Bonnet Carré and Morganza spillways are vital for the continued
existence of two major cities in south Louisiana—New Orleans and Baton
Rouge. 7 The spillways protect the cities from flooding while
simultaneously diverting the Mississippi River’s course away from these
cities. 8 The Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”) designed and built
the spillways and continue to manage their operation to this day along with
the entire Mississippi River protection system. 9 However, the Army Corps
has failed to implement sufficient upstream mitigation measures. 10 The
Army Corps’s failure has forced Louisiana flood control systems to
manage unrestricted water flow from upriver states.11 If left unchecked,
eration-of-Bonnet-Carre/ [https://perma.cc/2PRM-WF5W] (last visited Oct. 11,
2021); Morganza Floodway Overview, NEW ORLEANS DIST., U.S. ARMY CORPS
ENG’RS, https://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/Missions/Mississippi-River-Flood-Con
trol/Morganza-Floodway-Overview/ [https://perma.cc/DQ9D-HJF2] (last visited
Oct. 11, 2021).
4. See Historic Operations of the Bonnet Carré Spillway, supra note 3.
5. Id.
6. Experts Point to Bonnet Carre Spillway, supra note 2.
7. See Campbell Robertson, Louisiana Spillway Opened to Relieve
Flooding, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15
/us/15spillway.html [https://perma.cc/D4C6-JU5W].
8. See Bonnet Carré Spillway Overview, NEW ORLEANS DIST., U.S. ARMY
CORPS ENG’RS, https://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/Missions/Mississippi-RiverFlood-Control/Bonnet-Carre-Spillway-Overview/ [https://perma.cc/4S48-87S3]
(last visited Oct. 11, 2021); Historic Operations of the Bonnet Carré Spillway,
supra note 3; Morganza Floodway Overview, supra note 3; see also Masters,
supra note 1.
9. See Mississippi River & Tributaries, supra note 1.
10. In the context of this Comment, upstream mitigation means flood control
projects such as dams, reservoirs, and spillways upstream of Louisiana. See Drying
of the American West, Part A: Reservoirs on the Colorado River, EARTHLABS,
https://serc.carleton.edu/eslabs/drought/6a.html
[https://perma.cc/24H3-4V4X]
(last visited Oct. 11, 2021) (focusing on the map at the top of the web page listing
all dams and reservoirs in the Colorado Basin); cf. Mississippi River & Tributaries,
supra note 1.
11. See Mississippi River & Tribuaries, supra note 1; see also Experts Point
to Bonnet Carré Spillway, supra note 2.
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these unrestricted flows will eventually prove fatal to the state's saltwater
ecosystems. 12
This Comment will analyze the different policies and procedures
governing Mississippi River flood control as well as the structure of the
Mississippi River flood control system. This analysis will portray how the
Army Corps has failed to correctly manage the Mississippi Basin and
consequently allowed the present spillway crisis to unfold.
The antiquated design of the spillways, combined with an upstream
control system severely lacking in storage capacity, is slowly killing the
salt marshes and fisheries of not only the Pontchartrain Basin but also the
State of Mississippi. 13 While the Bonnet Carré is the only spillway
currently causing such crises, increasing flood intensity indicates that the
Morganza will almost certainly be contributing to the crisis soon. The
spillways are undoubtedly crucial to Louisiana’s economy and survival;
they protect the state’s two largest cities and Louisiana citizens’ way of
life. 14 Thus, the way the Army Corps views and manages flood control
infrastructure must change. The Mississippi River’s flood problem does
not solely impact Louisiana but rather the entire United States (“U.S.”). 15
Louisiana can no longer carry the burden of the entire Mississippi Basin’s
flood volume—it is devastating Sportsman’s Paradise. 16
A solution to saving Louisiana and alleviating this burden is for
Congress to ensure the Army Corps expands upstream storage capacity.
First, Congress must rein in the Army Corps’s broad governance in this
area; it can no longer be given such unrestrained authority over flood
control projects. 17 Congress has hardly questioned the Army Corps’s
infallibility since Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency, and that must change. 18
Congress should enact statutes and/or direct the Army Corps to
promulgate new regulations requiring the burden of controlling the
12. See Mississippi River & Tributaries, supra note 1; see also Experts Point
to Bonnet Carré Spillway, supra note 2.
13. See Experts Point to Bonnet Carré Spillway, supra note 2.
14. See Bonnet Carré Spillway Overview, supra note 8; see also Morganza
Floodway Overview, supra note 3; see also Masters, supra note 1.
15. See Experts Point to Bonnet Carré Spillway, supra note 2; see also 200
Miles, supra note 2.
16. See Experts Point to Bonnet Carré Spillway, supra note 2; see also 200
Miles, supra note 2.
17. See Oliver A. Houck, Breaking the Golden Rule: Judicial Review of
Federal Water Project Planning, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2012) (noting
the reliance upon a cost-benefit analysis and nothing else); see also 200 Miles,
supra note 2.
18. See Houck, supra note 17, at 11–12.
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Mississippi River to be divided amongst all states within the Mississippi
Basin.
Second, the states and interested citizens should be more inclined to
sue the Army Corps for its inadequate maintenance of the spillways, as
mishandling the spillways harms the natural resources owned by the state
and enjoyed by its citizens. 19 Lawsuits, such as those recently brought by
Louisiana and Mississippi, 20 will bring much-needed attention to the
management of Mississippi River flood control and lead to judicial review
of the Army Corps’s actions. Further, these actions may ignite a
reconsideration of Mississippi River flood control policy and spread the
burden of flood control along the entire river, rather than concentrating the
burden solely on the southern portion of the Mississippi Basin. Controlling
the release of floodwaters farther upstream will ease the burden on
spillways, but the Army Corps has not yet expressed a willingness to do
so. 21 Accordingly, congressional intervention may well present the most
viable means of saving Sportsman’s Paradise.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the background of the Mississippi
River flood control crisis to address why the system has become an issue.
Further, Part I will explain spillways generally, their effect on the
surrounding ecosystems, the Army Corps’s role in flood control, and the
Mississippi River flood control system as a whole.
Part II will analyze the applicable law to the problem at hand. Both the
Army Corps and the interstate interests of the Mississippi River are
governed by federal law. The Code of Federal Regulations and the U.S.
Code will be explored in order to understand where the shortcomings in
Mississippi River flood control lie. This Comment will also analyze the
current oversight regime, which consists of both judicial and legislative
entities.
Part III of this Comment will discuss several possible solutions to
balance the interests of the Army Corps, Congress, and concerned citizens;
spread the burden of flood control along the Mississippi River as much as
possible while avoiding any federal mandates of questionable
constitutionality; and ultimately save Sportsman’s Paradise. Part III will
also propose a solution of statutory reform directing the Army Corps to
use upstream mitigation measures whenever possible to allow for case-bycase determinations, maintaining the leading role of the Army Corps’s
19. See Experts Point to Bonnet Carré Spillway, supra note 2.
20. See, e.g., Harrison Cty. v. Miss. River Comm'n, No. 19cv986, 2020 WL
3159185 (S.D. Miss. June 12, 2020).
21. See Houck, supra note 17, at 11–12 (discussing the willingness of
Congress to blindly trust the Army Corps).
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expertise while creating a more structured system for control of the
Mississippi River.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Spillways: An Overview
The Bonnet Carré and Morganza spillways were constructed after the
Great Flood of 1927 to better control future flooding. 22 Following the
immense devastation of lives and property along the Mississippi River,
Congress acted to ensure that history would not repeat itself. 23 Thus, the
spillways were constructed with the initial function to safely discharge a
volume of water 29% greater than the Great Flood of 1927—which
equates to 3,030,000 cubic feet per second at the Red River gauge—
without endangering Louisiana cities to catastrophic flooding. 24
The Bonnet Carré Spillway was built in an old crevasse just north of
New Orleans and sits directly on the Mississippi River. 25 The Bonnet
Carré structure consists of 350 20-foot-wide bays closed by creosote
timbers and a floodway confined by guide levees emptying into Lake
Pontchartrain. 26 The timbers are not completely waterproof and allow
leakage during times of lesser flooding when the spillway is not in
operation. 27 This leakage mimics natural flood patterns by injecting a
small amount of freshwater into the Pontchartrain Basin. 28 During an
opening, crews pull the timbers from the bays individually, allowing up to
250,000 cubic feet of river water per second—which equates to
approximately three Olympic-size swimming pools per second—to flow
into Lake Pontchartrain, Lake Borgne, and the Gulf of Mexico. 29

22. See Mississippi River & Tributaries, supra note 1.
23. See id.
24. See id. The Red River gauge measures Mississippi River flow where the
Mississippi and Red Rivers meet, just north of the Morganza Spillway. Id. The
Red River Landing gauge is located just outside the town of Angola. Id.
25. Bonnet Carré Spillway Overview, supra note 8. A crevasse is a breach in
the bank of a river.
26. Id.
27. Spillway Operational Effects, NEW ORLEANS DIST., U.S. ARMY CORPS
ENG’RS, https://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/Missions/Mississippi-River-Flood-Con
trol/Bonnet-Carre-Spillway-Overview/Spillway-Operation-Information/ [https://
perma.cc/XE5Z-S39A] (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
28. Id.
29. See id.
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The Morganza Spillway is located further north than Bonnet Carré at
river mile 280 along the Mississippi River.30 The Morganza protects the
Baton Rouge levees and Old River. 31 It is a two-tiered structure. The first
component is the main spillway gates which control the flow of water
through the spillway. 32 The second tier is a floodway that guides water in
and out of the control structure. 33 The Morganza has only been used twice
in its history, first in 1973 and again in 2011. 34 At peak flow with all bays
open, the Morganza is capable of funneling 600,000 cubic feet per second
of river water down the spillway, into the Atchafalaya Floodway, and then
finally into the Gulf of Mexico. 35 Unlike the Bonnet Carré, the Morganza
Spillway flows through privately owned land that is rendered unusable
during an opening once spillway waters inundate the area. When the
Morganza opened in 2011, thousands of acres of pastureland and homes
were entirely submerged and inaccessible for the duration of the spillway’s
opening. 36
B. What the Spillways Protect
The main purpose of the spillways is relatively simple: to protect
Baton Rouge and New Orleans from Mississippi River floods.37 Both
spillways operating together can remove 850,000 cubic feet per second of
flow from the Mississippi River, greatly decreasing downstream levee
pressure. 38 Decreasing pressure on levees lessens the chance of a
catastrophic levee breach or overtopping during major flooding periods. 39
However, in 2019, Tropical Storm Barry threatened to overtop the New
Orleans levees despite the Bonnet Carré being fully open at the time. 40
This nearly catastrophic event serves as evidence that the spillways alone
are no longer a sufficient mechanism to control the Mississippi River.

30. See Morganza Floodway Overview, supra note 3.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Robertson, supra note 7.
37. Mississippi River & Tributaries, supra note 1.
38. See Morganza Floodway Overview, supra note 3; see also Spillway
Operational Effects, supra note 27.
39. Masters, supra note 1.
40. Id.
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The spillways also protect Louisiana’s Achilles heel: the Old River
Control Structure. 41 Old River was created to prevent the Mississippi
River from diverting course to the current Atchafalaya River channel
where the rivers meet 45 miles northwest of Baton Rouge. 42 The
Atchafalaya channel is shorter and steeper than the Mississippi—a more
tempting and natural path to the Gulf of Mexico. 43 Old River consists of
several structures that control the flow between the Mississippi and
Atchafalaya rivers; currently, about 30% of Mississippi River flow is
diverted by Old River. 44 This man-made obstacle stops the mighty
Mississippi, but should Old River fail the results would prove absolutely
catastrophic. 45 The Mississippi River would immediately shift west to the
current Atchafalaya channel, and this change in course would likely be
irreversible. 46 Baton Rouge and New Orleans would cease to be useful
ports in the blink of an eye, and the repercussions would be felt
worldwide. 47
The two instances the Morganza Spillway was opened were to prevent
this nightmare scenario. 48 The Army Corps was almost too late in the 1973
Morganza opening; while deliberations occurred over opening the
Morganza Spillway, Old River was nearly destroyed by rapidly rising
floodwaters. 49 The Morganza is used sparingly due to its impact on private
lands, but this may change with increasing flood intensity, as evidenced
by the more frequent Bonnet Carré openings. 50 Higher floods and longer
flood durations caused by climate change will inevitably test the resolve
of Old River more often in the future and will also require more openings
by both spillways.

41. Jeff Masters, If the Old River Control Structure Fails: A Catastrophe with
Global Impact, WEATHER UNDERGROUND (May 14, 2019, 4:01 AM), https://
www.wunderground.com/cat6/If-Old-River-Control-Structure-Fails-Catastrophe
-Global-Impact [https://perma.cc/QE6M-WGXD].
42. Masters, supra note 1.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Masters, supra note 41.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See Morganza Floodway Overview, supra note 3; see also Masters, supra
note 1.
49. See id.
50. See Historic Operation of Bonnet Carré Spillway, supra note 3.
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C. A History of the Operation of the Bonnet Carré and Morganza
Spillways
The Bonnet Carré Spillway was originally designed to be opened once
every ten years. 51 Historically, the spillway operated an average of once
every 7.5 years. 52 However, since 2000 the spillway has operated more
frequently, averaging once every 2.9 years. 53 In fact, the last five years
have seen five openings, two of which were in February and May of
2019. 54 The Army Corps stated that the positive effects of a Bonnet Carré
opening include nutrient replenishment and increased productivity of local
fisheries. 55 However, these possible benefits are based on the original
design of a ten-year opening frequency. 56 The increasing frequency of
spillway openings, particularly the double opening in 2019, undermines
that assumption significantly.
The Morganza Spillway has far less operational data than the Bonnet
Carré because it has only been opened twice in history, 57 due in part to the
Morganza’s location. 58 Thousands of acres of swamp and privately owned
land lie in the path of the Morganza Floodway, and notices are sent to
affected parties every year warning of the potential for an opening. 59 The
Army Corps bases its decision to open the Morganza mainly on the flow
of the Mississippi River on the east side of the control structure. 60 Careful
consideration must also be afforded to the wildlife and private citizens’
properties in the spillway’s path. 61

51. See Bonnet Carré Spillway Overview, supra note 8.
52. See Historic Operations of the Bonnet Carré Spillway, supra note 3.
53. Id.
54. See Spillway Operational Effects, supra note 27.
55. See id.
56. See Cultural, Environmental and Natural Values, NEW ORLEANS DIST.,
U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, https://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/Missions/Miss
issippi-River-Flood-Control/Bonnet-Carre-Spillway-Overview/Cultural-Environ
mental-and-Natural-Values/ [https://perma.cc/82SE-V9BN] (last visited Oct. 9,
2021).
57. See Morganza Floodway Overview, supra note 3.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See NEW ORLEANS DIST., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, MORGANZA
FLOODWAY INTERIM WATER CONTROL MANUAL PROPOSED CLARIFICATIONS TO
THE STANDING INSTRUCTIONS 1 (2014), https://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/Portals
/56/docs/MRT/MorganzaInterimWCMStandingInstructionsSimplifiedFINAL.pd
f [https://perma.cc/5LLF-TGXM].
61. See id.
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D. The Spillways’ Role in the Mississippi River Flood Control System
The Mississippi River is the world’s third-largest river basin, draining
41% of the continental U.S.’ land mass. 62 Major floods throughout the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries prompted Congress to pass the
Flood Control Act of 1928 (the “Act”) to protect cities and farms
developing along the Mississippi River. 63 In response, the Army Corps
created the Mississippi River flood control system, and it continues to
operate today. 64
The Mississippi River flood control system encompasses levees,
floodways, flood control reservoirs, and channel improvements. 65 The
purpose of flood control reservoirs is not only to provide water storage but
also to provide a flood control mechanism by filling up and retaining
floodwaters as river levels rise until there is a controlled release.66 In
accordance with the Army Corps’s plan, there are only five storage
reservoirs located in the entire Mississippi drainage basin: (1) Wappapello
Lake in Arkansas; (2) Arkabutla Lake in Mississippi; (3) Sardis Lake in
Mississippi; (4) Enid Lake in Mississippi; and (5) Grenada Lake in
Mississippi. 67 By comparison, the much smaller Colorado River Basin
contains 11 dams and storage reservoirs. 68
The Bonnet Carré and Morganza spillways are two of the largest flood
control projects along the Mississippi Basin. 69 Both spillways have
remained largely unchanged since their construction, while major river
flooding has worsened and become more frequent over time. 70 In theory,
during a major flood the Morganza would be opened first, and the Bonnet
Carré would be opened second. 71 This process would allow less water to
62. Mississippi Drainage Basin, NEW ORLEANS DIST., U.S. ARMY CORPS
ENG’RS, https://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/Missions/Mississippi-River-Flood-Con
trol/Mississippi-River-Tributaries/Mississippi-Drainage-Basin/ [https://perma.cc/G
9LT-3XZ4] (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Mississippi River & Tributaries, supra note 1.
66. Reservoir, BRITANNICA ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.britannica.com/
technology/reservoir (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
67. See Mississippi River & Tributaries, supra note 1.
68. See Drying of the American West, Part A: Reservoirs on the Colorado
River, supra note 10 (listing all dams and reservoirs in the Colorado Basin).
69. See Mississippi River & Tributaries, supra note 1.
70. See Historic Operations of the Bonnet Carré Spillway, supra note 3
(noting the increasing frequency of openings).
71. See Mississippi River & Tributaries, supra note 1.
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reach the Bonnet Carré and the brackish ecosystems into which it flows. 72
Instead, the Bonnet Carré is always opened before Morganza. Using
Morganza as a last resort invariably results in more freshwater flow
entering the brackish Ponchatrain Basin than if the Morganza Spillway had
been operating in tandem with the Bonnet Carré.
E. The Army Corps of Engineers’ Role in Flood Control
The Army Corps is the principal actor in Mississippi River flood
control. 73 The Act ordered construction of both the Bonnet Carré and
Morganza spillways under the direction of the Army Corps. 74 The Act has
been updated periodically to provide the Army Corps with more funding
and projects. Under the Act, the Army Corps has control over not only the
Mississippi’s main channel but also over the “watercourses connected
with the Mississippi River.” 75 This grants the Army Corps broad authority
to build flood control projects along the entire Mississippi River as well as
the watercourses connected to it, covering a very large geographic area.
The Army Corps primarily uses river flow rates to determine when to
open the Bonnet Carré and Morganza spillways.76 The Army Corps
considers opening the Morganza when the Red River Landing Gauge
measures a flow of 1.5 million cubic feet per second and rising. 77 The
decision to open the Bonnet Carré is evaluated by observing flows at the
Carrollton Gauge, which is located just outside of New Orleans. 78 Once
opened, the spillways remain open until river flows fall below the
threshold for opening.
The Army Corps must obtain approval from Congress for all new
flood control projects, especially those along the Mississippi River. The
Army Corps leans heavily on a cost-benefit ratio to convince Congress of
a project’s usefulness; in other words, if a cost-benefit ratio is greater than
1:1, Congress is likely to approve the project. 79 Congress tends to accept
72. See Mississippi River & Tributaries, supra note 1; see also Pontchartrain
Basin Hydrocoast Maps, PONTCHARTRAIN CONSERVANCY, https://scienceforour
coast.org/pc-programs/coastal/coastal-projects/hydrocoast-maps/pontchartrain-bas
in/ [https://perma.cc/9KNL-4LXL] (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 702.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. See Morganza Floodway Overview, supra note 3; see also Historic
Operations of the Bonnet Carré Spillway, supra note 3.
77. Morganza Floodway Overview, supra note 3.
78. Historic Operations of the Bonnet Carré Spillway, supra note 3.
79. See Houck, supra note 17, at 11–12.
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the Army Corps’s recommendations without much inquiry and
consequently provides the Army Corps broad deference on how to spend
taxpayer dollars on flood control. 80
F. The Spillways’ Effects on Saltwater Ecosystems
During the design and construction of the Bonnet Carré Spillway, the
Army Corps ensured the spillway as designed would mimic natural
flooding and provide long term benefits to the Pontchartrain Basin. 81 This
assumption, however, was based on the design frequency of operation
every ten years. 82 Recently, this spillway has been operating much more
frequently and for significantly longer periods, resulting in catastrophic
damage to brackish ecosystems in the immediate area. 83
In an unprecedented event, the Bonnet Carré was opened twice in
2019. 84 This caused salinity levels to plummet in the Pontchartrain Basin
from March through the summer of 2019. 85 Historically, this expected
salinity drop was not an issue because the spillway operated far less
frequently and for shorter durations compared to the past two decades. 86
Eventually, news articles began to report saltwater animals such as
bottlenose dolphins and oysters dying en masse. 87 As far away as the
Mississippi Sound, saltwater fish were killed or seriously injured by the
sudden and prolonged salinity drop. 88 The charter fishing industry all but
disappeared, algae blooms destroyed entire ecosystems, and brown
shrimp—the base of any saltwater ecosystem—disappeared. 89 The
freshwater intrusion precipitated by the 2019 double opening of the
Bonnet Carré was so far-reaching that the effects could be clearly seen
from space. 90
80. Id. at 24.
81. See Bonnet Carré Spillway Overview, supra note 8.
82. See id.
83. Spillway Operational Effects, supra note 27.
84. See id.
85. See Pontchartrain Basin Hydrocast Maps, supra note 72. Specifically,
note the time period spans between the first drop in salinity starting in March 2019
until “normal” salinity is restored. Id.
86. See id.; see also Historic Operations of the Bonnet Carré Spillway, supra
note 3. Notice for each year the spillway opens the corresponding drop in salinity
in the Pontchartrain Basin hydrocast maps. Id.
87. See Experts Point to Bonnet Carre Spillway, supra note 2.
88. See id.
89. 200 Miles, supra note 2.
90. See Eric Jeansonne, Why Mississippi Sound Salinity Levels Are Low and
How Opening Morganza Spillway Can Lower Freshwater Intrusion, WLOX
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The Bonnet Carré’s double opening was so detrimental to the
Louisiana and Mississippi saltwater economies that a lawsuit was filed by
Mississippi counties and later joined by Louisiana: Harrison County,
Mississippi v. Mississippi River Commission. 91 In Harrison County, the
plaintiffs alleged that the Army Corps failed to complete several studies,
including an Environmental Impact Study (“EIS”), before the 2019 double
opening of the spillway. 92 The plaintiffs argued that the Army Corps failed
to properly control the 2019 Mississippi River flood and caused
unnecessary damage to the local saltwater ecosystem because of their
failure to complete an EIS before opening the Bonnet Carré on two
separate occasions. 93 Harrison County is currently pending in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.94 The plaintiffs are
seeking an injunction forcing the Army Corps to perform an EIS on the
Bonnet Carré Spillway in hopes that the EIS will change future operations
and promote more frequent usage of the Morganza Spillway. 95
II. ANALYSIS
This flood control crisis is a two-fold problem. First, the law fails to
provide adequate checks and balances over the Army Corps’s decisionmaking processes. Second, there are shortcomings within the current
oversight regime governing Mississippi River flood control.
A. Flood Control Statutes and Regulations
1. United States Code and the Code of Federal Regulations
Title 33 of the U.S. Code governs navigable waters and provides that
federal improvements to all rivers, harbors, and other waterways are under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Chief Engineer of the Army. 96 The
(June 2, 2019, 11:58 PM), https://www.wlox.com/2019/06/03/why-mississippisound-salinity-levels-are-low-how-opening-morganza-spillway-can-lower-fresh
water-intrusion/.
91. See Harrison Cnty. v. Miss. River Comm’n, No. 19cv986, 2020 WL
3159185 (S.D. Miss. June 12, 2020).
92. Id. at *1. An EIS is a full report made by the Army Corps of Engineers of
every environmental impact caused by a given project along with any mitigation
measures.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. 33 U.S.C. § 540.
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authority to plan for the Mississippi River is vested in the Mississippi
River Commission. 97 33 U.S.C. § 647 states that the duties of the
Mississippi River Commission are the following: deepen the channel,
protect the banks, prevent floods, promote commerce, and submit to the
Secretary of the Army reports of these plans. 98 Therefore, under this
statute the Mississippi River Commission may technically be its own
entity, but it reports primarily to the Army Corps.99
33 U.S.C. § 702a provides for the enactment of the 1927 Mississippi
River Project. The statute directs the Mississippi River Commission to
determine the best method for securing flood relief, in addition to
levees. 100 The works conducted under this statute must also “fully and
amply protect the adjacent lands.” 101 This statute establishes the
continuing responsibilities of the Commission, as the Mississippi River
Flood Control project continues to this day.
The Code of Federal Regulations contains very little else pertaining to
Mississippi River flood control. 102 The lack of specific requirements
leaves the Army Corps and Mississippi River Commission with
substantial discretion in fulfilling their statutory mandates. A lack of
express law indicates a lack of constraints on the actions of the person or
entity bound by that law. Most of the flood control regulations within the
Code of Federal Regulations apply to cost sharing and maintenance or to
areas other than the Mississippi Basin. 103 An entire chapter covers specific
flood control projects throughout the country, yet none of the chapters or
regulations address Mississippi River Basin flood control. 104
2. Potential Statutory Issues Within the Army Corps’s Authority
The first potential issue within the U.S. Code is the extensive authority
and latitude granted to the Army Corps. The Army Corps and Mississippi
River Commission control the entire Mississippi River project, and this
level of control does not leave much room for oversight. While the Army
Corps boasts the expertise of numerous engineers and scientists, its

97. Id. § 647.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. 33 U.S.C. § 702a.
101. Id.
102. See generally 33 C.F.R. ch. 2 (2021) (noting in particular the flood control
statutes tailored to specific watersheds or areas).
103. See generally id.
104. See id.
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fallibility is evidenced by the 2019 double opening. 105 Congress, acting on
taxpayers’ behalf by footing the flood control bill, needs to become more
involved in the Army Corps’s actions regarding the Mississippi River. The
Mississippi River and its management impact not only the states that
border it but also the entire world through the substantial amount of
commerce transported along the river.
The broad language of 33 U.S.C. § 702a allows for a great deal of
statutory interpretation. The Mississippi River Commission is instructed
to implement the best way to prevent flooding and protect adjacent
lands. 106 Modern civil engineering is meant to balance cost effectiveness
with sustainability. 107 Sustainability is defined by the American Society of
Civil Engineers (ASCE) as “maintain[ing] and improv[ing] [the] quality
of life indefinitely, without degrading the quantity, quality, or availability
of natural, economic, and social resources.” 108 By this definition, the best
flood control plan for the Mississippi River would involve sustainability
factors. The current plan for Mississippi River flood control lacks this
requisite sustainability factor because increasing flood severity cannot be
alleviated without collection action from upstream states. Further, this
approach is not sustainable because flooding is projected to increase in
intensity in future years, and the current Mississippi River flood control
system is already being pushed past its design parameters. 109 This is
evidenced by the increasing frequency of Bonnet Carré openings, which
have consistently been more often than the ten-year design period. 110
Congress should clarify this section of the U.S. Code to include the ASCE
design principles of sustainability in every new Army Corps project. These
principles will act as a constraint that effectively requires the Army Corps
to investigate all possible options for new projects, such as upstream
storage in states that may not feel the brunt of Mississippi River flooding,
but ultimately makes the Mississippi River flood control system more
sustainable as a whole.
105. See Harrison Cnty. v. Miss. River Comm’n, No. 19cv986, 2020 WL
3159185 (S.D. Miss. June 12, 2020).
106. See 33 U.S.C. § 702a.
107. See Code of Ethics, AM. SOC. CIV. ENG’RS, https://www.asce.org/careergrowth/ethics/code-of-ethics [https://perma.cc/7QXG-8P9C] (demonstrating that
all civil engineers are bound by the canons).
108. Sustainability, AM. SOC. CIV. ENG’RS, https://www.asce.org/communi
ties/institutes-and-technical-groups/sustainability [https://perma.cc/RW73-TRB6]
(last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
109. See Bonnet Carré Spillway Overview, supra note 8 (showing the ten-year
design frequency).
110. See Historic Operations of the Bonnet Carré Spillway, supra note 3.
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The lack of statutory and regulatory authority pertaining to Mississippi
River flood control is telling in and of itself. Although a few relevant
provisions do currently exist, these provisions are unclear and do not
actually address the Mississippi River flood control problem. 111 Some
authorities address specific flood control projects but do not include the
Mississippi River. 112 Further, over the last three years, appropriations bills
have not specifically addressed the Mississippi River and Tributaries
project, which is the overarching Army Corps project that addresses
Mississippi River flood control. 113 Great authority is granted to the Army
Corps and Mississippi River Commission by Congress to the extent that
the Army Corp spends billions of dollars each year on various projects.
However, that money is rarely spent on improving flood control along the
Mississippi River. 114 Unfortunately, the Army Corps’s broad authority in
this area is nearly absolute, as will be discussed further in Part II. Although
Congress technically has the final say on paper, it has afforded great
deference to the Army Corps in its control of the Mississippi River. 115 It is
past time for Congress to be more involved in Mississippi River flood
control, and the future of Sportsman’s Paradise depends on it.
B. Oversight
1. Current Oversight Regime of the Army Corps of Engineers
Congress is the principal overseer of the Army Corps. Congress
formed the Army Corps when it created the Army and thus holds the

111. See generally 33 C.F.R. ch. 2 (2021).
112. See id.
113. See Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act,
2019, Pub. L. No. 116-20, 133 Stat. 871; see also America’s Water Infrastructure
Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-270, 132 Stat. 3765; Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348; see also Bipartisan Budget Act of
2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64; see also Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135.
114. See, e.g., Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief
Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-20, 133 Stat. 871; see also also America’s Water
Infrastructure Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-270, 132 Stat. 3765; Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348; see also Bipartisan
Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64; see also Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135.
115. Houck, supra note 17, at 24.
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authority over its maintenance. 116 Congress also possesses the power of
the purse, namely the Army Corps’s spending powers. 117 Congress thus
has the authority to regulate the Army Corps and its actions. However,
Congress has retreated from this authority as it relates to general flood
control due to a perceived lack of knowledge, specifically when
considering Mississippi River flood control. The most significant evidence
of Congress’s inaction in this area is the lack of statutes and regulations
governing Mississippi River flood control, resulting in the Army Corps’s
great latitude in decisions concerning the management of the Mississippi
River Basin. 118
The judicial branch has also served as a historic overseer of the Army
Corps. The Supreme Court, in fact, has allowed entities to obtain damages
from the federal government due to the mismanagement of floodways by
the Army Corps. 119 In Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United
States, the Court ruled that temporary flooding could amount to a “taking”
by the federal government and awarded compensation for damages. 120
Under the reasoning of Arkansas Game & Fish, seasonal flooding may rise
to the level of a “taking” and thereby allow for damages when: (1) time,
(2) foreseeability, (3) severity of action, and (4) any other relevant factors,
weighed together, constitute a “taking” by the federal government of state
and private property. 121
In Harrison County, Mississippi and Louisiana sued the Army Corps
over its handling of the 2019 Bonnet Carré double opening. 122 The
plaintiffs alleged a failure by the Mississippi River Commission and the
Army Corps to conduct a full EIS and sought an injunction forcing the
Army Corps to perform the study. 123 Whether or not this suit is ultimately
successful, the same plaintiffs and interested citizens could likely sue for
damages under the reasoning of Arkansas Game & Fish.
Here, Louisiana and Mississippi would need to allege specific facts to
prove the double opening of the Bonnet Carré constituted a “taking.” If the
states can prove a taking, the states may be entitled to damages. These
116. See The Beginnings to 1815, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, https://www
.usace.army.mil/About/History/Brief-History-of-the-Corps/Beginnings/ [https://
perma.cc/JU4J-DFTG] (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
117. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
118. See 33 C.F.R. ch. 2 (2021); see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 641–653a, 701–709c.
119. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 586 U.S. 23 (2012).
120. Id. at 513.
121. Id. at 522–23.
122. See Harrison Cnty. v. Miss. River Comm'n, No. 19cv986, 2020 WL
3159185, at *1 (S.D. Miss. June 12, 2020).
123. Id.
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facts will be analyzed using the Arkansas Game & Fish reasoning in the
next section to illustrate the problems inherent in the use of damages as a
remedy for missteps by the Army Corps.
2. Shortcomings in the Current Oversight Regime
Arguing for damages stemming from the destruction of saltwater
ecosystems by a spillway would be fairly straightforward from a Louisiana
perspective. Under Louisiana Civil Code article 3413, the state owns the
wild animals, birds, fish, and shellfish. 124 The Army Corps’s failure to
manage the spillway appropriately during the 2019 double opening led to
decreased salinity levels and resulted in the deaths of large amounts of fish
and shellfish. 125 Using the reasoning in Arkansas Game & Fish, the
analysis would proceed as follows: (1) the Army Corps flooded saltwater
ecosystems from February through the summer; (2) this flooding was
foreseeable because opening the spillway floods the Pontchartrain Basin
with river water; and (3) the results of the Army Corps’s actions were
severe and led to significant harms. Due to the loss of fish and shellfish
caused by the Army Corps’s actions, the two million citizens working in
the seafood industry lost a substantial amount of income, and the state lost
tax revenue because these citizens could not bring in profits from the $185
billion seafood industry. 126 Therefore, the state and its citizens should be
entitled to damages under the takings clause as in Arkansas Game &
Fish. 127
Court-awarded damages alone do not address the root of the problem,
however. The root of the problem in Mississippi River flood control is the
lack of upstream participation. Forcing the federal government to pay
damages to injured parties will only reduce money available for
improvement projects upriver from Louisiana and thus defeats the purpose
of compelling the Army Corps to revamp Mississippi River flood control.
The underlying problem with the lack of congressional oversight of
the Army Corps is a one-sided coin. Congress is unwilling to balance and
check the Army Corps’s recommendations. A Rutgers Law Review article
summarizes the issue:
124. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3413 (2021).
125. See Experts Point to Bonnet Carre Spillway, supra note 2; see also 200
Miles, supra note 2.
126. Kevin Savoie, Coastal Fishing Equals Jobs, LA. FISHERIES: CHENIER
ECOLOGY (Jan. 2009), https://www.seagrantfish.lsu.edu/resources/chenier/2009
/01-09.htm [https://perma.cc/6Q2S-JCRZ] (focusing on the combined sales and
combined jobs of both commercial and recreational fishing).
127. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 27 (2012).
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If the cost-benefit ratio was said to be positive, that closed the
question. It did for the Congress, and for everyone else. For its
part, Congress could be “dazzlingly uninquisitive” and deferential
so long as the ratio was said to be positive. “The Corps says this
is a worthwhile project,” said the head of a local Chamber of
Commerce of the Yazoo Pump project in Mississippi (described
privately by a Corps lobbyist as “an economic dud with huge
environmental consequences”), “[w]hat else is there to say?” 128
This lack of congressional interest has allowed the Mississippi River flood
control system to become dangerously outdated. Congress appears to
perceive the Army Corps as an infallible entity.129 Considering the Army
Corps has a history of massive cost overruns and unsuccessful projects,
this congressional trust is severely misplaced. 130 Congress may not possess
the expertise of the many engineers and scientists in the Army Corps, but
Congress should impose a new methodology for the Army Corps to follow
rather than its one-sided equation for flood control projects.
Congress’s lack of action on Mississippi River flood control,
evidenced by the silence in the U.S. Code and Code of Federal
Regulations, depicts an insufficient approach that has allowed the Army
Corps to mismanage a key artery of interstate commerce: the Mississippi
River. The Mississippi River flood control plan has become outdated and
outclassed by increasing flood severity. Congress first enacted the
Mississippi River and Tributaries Project in 1928.131 Seemingly, the
philosophy of flood control hasn’t changed, namely controlling nearly the
entire flow of the Mississippi River from Louisiana. However,
development along the Mississippi River and weather patterns have not
remained stagnant since 1928.
More development along the river causes more water to enter it, as
increasing development allows for less land area to absorb the water. More
water coming into the river combined with more intense storms results in
higher flows entering the Mississippi River. Higher flows should thus be
contained upstream and released in a controlled manner to assist
downstream areas in flood control, but currently Congress has no way to
ensure that happens. As recently as 2019, the outdated and outclassed
nature of this system was exposed. A tropical storm, typically a non-event
in Louisiana, threatened to overtop New Orleans levees. 132 This situation
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Houck, supra note 17, at 24.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 20–21.
Mississippi Drainage Basin, supra note 62.
Masters, supra note 41.
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was created by the combination of extremely high floodwaters in the
Mississippi and strong southerly wind from the storm, despite the Bonnet
Carré Spillway operating at the time. 133 Thankfully, the levees did not
overtop, much to the relief of concerned weather forecasters and citizens,
but the vulnerability of an outdated system with little upstream storage
capacity was severely exposed. 134
III. SOLUTION
A. Stricter Statutory and Regulatory Frameworks
Current statutes and regulations do not provide meaningful direction
for the Army Corps with respect to Mississippi River flood control
projects. 135 This allows the Army Corps to do what it has always done:
open the spillways to save Louisiana whenever the river rises. This tactic
may have worked when the spillways were designed, but due to increasing
floods, the spillways are being opened so often that they are severely
harming the brackish ecosystems into which they flow. 136 Opening the
Bonnet Carré now creates a slew of problems with lasting damage due to
increasing instances of opening, specifically massive kills of saltwater
marine life. 137
The long-term benefits of increased productivity detailed on the Army
Corps’s website no longer apply because the design that created those
long-term benefits has been surpassed by changes in the river. 138
Rebuilding or upgrading the spillways is also not feasible. The spillways
would need to be put out of service for the duration of the rebuild, and the
ever-increasing volume of water would still inundate the same areas—but
at a much higher rate. The Army Corps has proven that it is not willing to
spread the flood control burden amongst Mississippi River states, as only
five storage reservoirs currently exist in the entire Mississippi River
Basin. 139

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See generally 33 C.F.R. ch. 2 (2021); see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 641–653a,
701–709c.
136. See Spillway Operational Effects, supra note 27; cf. Experts Point to
Bonnet Carré Spillway, supra note 2 (noting the effects in 2019 when the spillway
was opened twice).
137. See 200 Miles, supra note 2.
138. Spillway Operational Effects, supra note 27.
139. Mississippi River & Tributaries, supra note 1.
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Since the Army Corps clearly does not view Mississippi River flood
control as a burden that should be shared by all interested states, Congress
must act as the Army Corps’s overseer. This can take the form of new
statutes enacted by Congress and/or new regulations issued by the Army
Corps pursuant to that authority.
Part 208 of the Code of Federal Regulations contains flood control
regulations but does not mention the Mississippi River and Tributaries
Project. 140 A section should be added to this portion of the Code of Federal
Regulations mandating that efforts be employed to create more upstream
storage capacity along the Mississippi River to the “maximum extent
practicable.” 141 This language already appears in Louisiana’s coastal
restoration statutes to use the best possible barriers to prevent further
erosion, which allows for determinations regarding what the best erosion
control will be but expresses a strong preference for a specific method.142
Such a provision can also be readily adopted for flood control and will
likely relieve some of the burden on downstream spillways. The same
amount of water would come downriver as before, but this time in a
controlled manner such that spillway openings would either be
unnecessary or less impactful.
The Army Corps has unfettered autonomy under the current
management system for the Mississippi Basin, so it is unlikely to
voluntarily relinquish this latitude. Thus, Congress must act. Congress can
either add requirements directly to the U.S. Code or direct the Army Corps
to update its regulations. Reformation of the Code of Federal Regulations
could create lasting and meaningful change. There are statutes and
regulations in existence designated for specific watersheds and projects,
so it is certainly not unprecedented to bestow the Army Corps with
congressional guidance on flood control. Amendments to the Code of
Federal Regulations would also allow the Army Corps to craft regulations
that work well within their administrative procedure instead of
cumbersome statutory mandates that may or may not fit within the its
current administration. Further, amendments to the Code of Federal
Regulations would allow Congress to provide the Army Corps with the
desired result of a proposed regulation and leave the specific language of
the regulation up to the Army Corps. This will likely be easier to pass in
our age of congressional gridlock than a specific statutory mandate.
Congress can, at the most, mandate that each state drained by the
Mississippi River ensures that it does not increase the amount of flow
140. See 33 C.F.R. pt. 208 (2021).
141. See infra Part III.A and note 142.
142. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 1, § 709 (2021).

556

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. X

entering the river. This type of mandate would put an end to increasing
flood waters. However, this solution would likely be incredibly expensive
or even impossible to implement due to issues of acquiring property,
constructing structures, and disrupting the economic progress along the
river and adjoining communities. The issue of acquiring necessary
property alone would be unpalatable, as states would have to purchase
large areas of land from riparian owners who may not be willing to sell. A
far more feasible approach is statutory reform which would continue to
give the Army Corps deference in managing flood protection while
providing the rest of the federal government specific, easily reviewed
guidelines.
Congress should direct the Army Corps to create regulations with the
effect of requiring the Army Corps to increase upstream storage capacity
“to the maximum extent practicable” 143 to control downstream flooding.
“[T]o the maximum extent practicable” 144 would require a case-by-case
determination based on the geography of possible project areas, ability of
the local area to facilitate a storage reservoir, funding, and any other
pertinent factors. This option would control downstream flooding at the
source (upstream flow increases) and would not entirely burden Congress
with specific statutory language or completely tie the hands of the Army
Corps. Such a solution would avoid massive federal mandates with
questionable constitutionality and allow water projects to move forward
with the Army Corps’s expertise at the helm. Amending regulations also
provides Congress and the courts some ability to review the Army Corps
with statutes and regulations specifically addressed to the Mississippi
Basin and include specific determination factors.
B. Stricter Congressional Oversight of the Army Corps That Mandates
Spreading the Burden of Flood Control
The Army Corps must adhere to Congress in obtaining funding for its
projects. 145 The Army Corps must attend committee meetings to
demonstrate the viability of its projects and answer questions from
Congress during the budgetary process. Committee meetings with the
Army Corps in attendance are Congress’s chance to ensure the Army
Corps is spreading the burden of Mississippi River flood control while
avoiding the controversy and debate of enacting new statutes.

143. See discussion supra Part III.A.
144. See discussion supra Part III.A.
145. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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Congress must alter its mindset about the Army Corps for an
oversight-only regime to work and instead must think of itself as qualified
to question the Army Corps’s decisions. Congress may not hold the
technical expertise of the Army Corps, but a body as diverse as Congress
is more than capable of asking more substantive questions rather than only
cost-benefit ratios. Congress is spending the taxpayers’ money, in massive
amounts, on flood control. Therefore, it should take an active role to ensure
that the flood control burden is being adequately shared along the
Mississippi River. Representatives and senators should ask questions of
the Army Corps in committee meetings to ensure that the Army Corps
evaluates all possible alternatives for flood control. This will result in
oversight of the Army Corps without having to pass statutes creating
federal mandates which could subsequently be challenged in court.
Ultimately, this would not prove as effective as statutory and/or
regulatory reform because congressional hearings would be the only check
on the actions of the Army Corps pertaining to Mississippi River flood
control. Further, Congress is unlikely to change its long-held perception
on their own inability to question the Army Corps’s wisdom. 146 Statutory
and regulatory reform would allow judicial oversight as well as
congressional oversight.
C. Judicial Review of Army Corps’s Projects and Actions
The Court in Arkansas Game & Fish held without question that courts
can award damages in some cases for flooding when the flooding
constitutes a “taking.” 147 However, monetary damages are meant as a
remedial measure for already existing property damages. These damages
cannot act as a cure-all for future flooding caused by Army Corps’s
mismanagement because damages paid to injured parties will not prevent
further flooding disasters from occurring. Alternatively, if Congress enacts
new legislation mandating the spreading of Mississippi River flood control
among interested states, courts can interpret these statutes and enforce
them against the Army Corps—preventing future flooding disasters from
occurring.
Statutes and regulations should be carefully constructed to allow
judges latitude in determining if the Army Corps and Mississippi River
Commission performed their jobs in spreading the burden of flood control
amongst interested states in the Mississippi River Basin. Judges need to
be able to make fact-specific inquiries into the actions of the Army Corps.
146. See Houck, supra note 17, at 11–12.
147. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 40 (2012).
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More oversight is beneficial for federal agencies. The language of “to the
maximum extent practicable” 148 can be augmented with various factors
governing the feasibility and sustainability of flood control projects to
create a balance that is concretely defined and easy to work with.
CONCLUSION
While the spillways’ existence is necessary, continued operation
without additional aid from upstream states will cause irreversible damage
to the economy Louisiana has built around its saltwater ecosystems; the
damages of the 2019 double opening may very well be only a taste of the
damages to come. 149 In Louisiana alone, $185 billion and over two million
jobs are at stake. 150 Without action, predicted increases in flood and storm
severity due to climate change will only exacerbate the problems of
Louisiana’s saltwater ecosystems. 151 Congress must rein in the Army
Corps, either by congressional directives for agency action or by
congressional bills mandating the spreading of flood control across the
whole Mississippi Basin “to the maximum extent practicable” 152 by
prioritizing increases in upstream storage capacity.
Should these changes be made, the burden of Mississippi River flood
control will be spread amongst all interested parties, not just concentrated
in the state furthest downstream. The end goal of Mississippi River flood
control should be to: (1) spread the burden of flood control as best as
possible among the states along the Mississippi, thus reducing the flow to
Louisiana and (2) slow the opening frequency of spillways, specifically
the Bonnet Carré, down to the historical average that helped saltwater
ecosystems rather than destroyed them. If the solutions detailed within this
Comment are implemented, river flows into Louisiana will be reduced,
and Sportsman’s Paradise can ultimately be saved from inevitable
destruction.

148. See discussion supra Part III.A.
149. See Experts Point to Bonnet Carre Spillway, supra note 2; see also 200
Miles, supra note 2.
150. Savoie, supra note 126.
151. See Experts Point to Bonnet Carre Spillway, supra note 2.; see also 200
Miles, supra note 2.
152. See discussion supra Part III.A.

